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Data sharing presents many opportunities in terms of stimulating innovation and creating a level playing 
field between businesses, but also carries risks by potentially decreasing incentives for data collection and 
analysis, facilitating collusion between firms or exploiting consumers as well as undermining privacy. The 
paper maps the limits and enablers of data sharing in the fields of EU competition, data protection and 
consumer law and illustrates how an optimal regulatory framework for data sharing can maximise the 
benefits while minimising the risks. The paper sets out an analytical framework for data sharing by outlining 
how the three regimes complement each other in either limiting or enabling data sharing, and by outlining 
the tensions within and between these three regimes. Considering their different scope, it is of the utmost 
importance that the three legal instruments are applied consistently. This means, on the one hand, that any 
conflict should be alleviated or minimised and, on the other hand, that the instruments should be applied 
more as complements than as substitutes. Such an objective can only be achieved if the authorities in charge 
of enforcement of the different legal instruments cooperate closely with each other to ensure consistent and 
complementary interpretation. The paper concludes that the three horizontal instruments, if implemented 
effectively, already facilitate or even impose the sharing of data in many circumstances. As a result, the 
existing horizontal rules should be complemented with new sectoral rules only when they have proved to 
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1.1. Scope of the paper 
 
Data is regarded as an essential resource for innovation, economic growth, and societal progress in various 
fields, ranging from health, agriculture and energy to intelligent transport systems, finance and smart cities.5 
To unleash the full potential of data for the economy, mechanisms to create wider accessibility and reuse 
of data across private and public actors are now being devised in many areas of our lives. Although data 
sharing is generally seen as beneficial for welfare,6 the exchange of data can also lead to concerns regarding 
privacy, collusion or consumer protection when it enables market players to exploit consumers.  
 
This paper maps how competition, data protection and consumer law position themselves towards data 
sharing. A neutral stance is taken, implying that we do not aim to argue in favour or against data sharing. 
Instead, the objective of the paper is to analyse to what extent competition, data protection and consumer 
law either limit or enable data sharing. Because the focus is purely on a legal analysis, economic, ethical, 
technical and other insights about the feasibility and desirability of data sharing are not considered. Our 
findings can inform debates about the design of new data sharing regimes by pointing out the limits and 
enablers of data sharing under the three horizontal regimes that are applicable to all sectors of the economy.  
 
For a number of industries, sector-specific regimes relating to data sharing already exist, including the 
Payment Services Directive 2 (access-to-account rule)7 and the new Electricity Directive (access to 
metering and consumption data).8 In addition, a code of conduct on data sharing has been adopted by market 
players in the agricultural sector9 and discussions about data sharing in the automotive sector10 are ongoing. 
The paper does not analyse these sector-specific regimes. Instead, it aims to draw lessons from how the 
regimes of competition, data protection and consumer law interact in stimulating and restricting data 
sharing. Lessons drawn are relevant for these sectors too, as the existence of sector-specific legislation does 
not preclude the applicability of horizontal regimes such as competition, data protection and consumer law.  
We use the notion ‘data sharing’ as an umbrella term referring to the various ways in which data can be 
exchanged. This includes access to (ability to look at and potentially use the data, depending on the 
conditions set by the regime at stake) as well as portability of data (ability to transfer or copy data). The 
paper does not analyse Government-to-Business data sharing as covered by the Open Data and Public 
Sector Information Directive11, nor is Business-to-Government data sharing covered.12 Relevant 
dimensions of data sharing for our purposes are: Business-to-Business, Business-to-Consumer as well as 
Business-to-Consumer-to-business (where for instance a consumer requests access to or portability of data 
that is then shared with another provider). 
 
At the outset, it is worthwhile to keep in mind the objectives of the three regimes under investigation. All 
three regimes contribute to the integration of the internal market and protect the welfare of consumers or 
                                                 
5 Communication from the Commission, ‘Building a European Data Economy, COM (2017) 9, p. 2 and 8. 
6 Mayer-Schonberger and Ramge (2018). 
7 Articles 66 and 67 of Directive 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market [2015] OJ L 337/35. 
8 Article 23(1) of Directive 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the 
internal market for electricity [2019] OJ L 158/125. 
9 EU Code of conduct on agricultural data sharing by contractual agreement, April 2018, available at https://copa-
cogeca.eu/img/user/files/EU%20CODE/EU_Code_2018_web_version.pdf. 
10 Commission, ‘On the road to automated mobility: An EU strategy for mobility of the future’ (Communication) COM (2018) 283 
final, p. 13. 
11 Directive 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector 
information [2019] OJ L 172/56. 
12 Business-to-Government data sharing is discussed in Commission Staff Working Document ‘Guidance on sharing private sector 
data, SWD (2018) 125. 
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data subjects. Although there is an overlap in objectives, the means by which the objectives are pursued 
differ. Competition law tries to protect consumer welfare by intervening against anticompetitive behaviour, 
consumer law aims to assist consumers as the weaker party in market transactions and data protection law 
provides data subjects with control over their personal data and partly has a basis in fundamental rights 
protection.13 Because of their different scope of protection, the three regimes can complement each other 
but may also conflict in how they treat data sharing. 
 
Table 1: Comparison between the goals and scope of the legal instruments 
 
Types of legal 
instrument 
 Competition protection  Consumer protection Personal data 
protection  
Main Objectives  Economic total or 
consumer welfare and 
beyond 
Transparency and 
fairness in possibly 
unbalanced transactions 
Data subject privacy 
and self-determination 




Transactions relying on 
personal data 
 
In light of the above, the goal of this paper is two-fold. First, it presents the dual relationship that 
competition, personal data protection and consumer law have with data sharing. Indeed, while these three 
fields of law can potentially limit data sharing (Section 2), they can also enable it (Section 3). Second, it 
will draw an analytical framework for data sharing by outlining how these regimes complement each other, 
on the one hand, and by outlining the tensions within and between these three regimes, on the other hand 
(Section 4). 
 
1.2. Definition and characteristics of data 
 
Personal and non-personal data play an increasing role in the economy and society as they can be collected 
cheaply with the deployment of connected devices and they can be analysed more usefully with the 
development of Artificial Intelligence techniques. Digital data can be defined as ‘machine-readable encoded 
information’14 while big data can be defined as ‘the information asset characterized by such a high volume, 
velocity and variety to require specific technology and analytical methods for its transformation into 
value’15.16 
 
Thus, the value and interest of data is in the information and the knowledge that may be inferred from such 
data.17 Information sciences use the concept of a data pyramid to explain the relationship between data, 
information and knowledge18 and such a pyramid may be applied to the data value chain as explained by 
Gal and Rubinfeld (2019). This value chain comprises several links: (i) first, raw personal and non-personal 
data are collected directly or bought on a secondary data market; (ii) second, data are structured and turned 
into information; (iii) third, those structured data are analysed by algorithms and information is turned into 
knowledge, such as a prediction; and finally (iv) the analysis of the structured data leads to an action such 
                                                 
13 See Graef (2018a:121-151). 
14 Zech (2016). 
15 De Mauro et al. (2016). 
16 For definition and categories of data, see also Autorité de la concurrence and Bundeskartellamt (2016:4-7). 
17 Interestingly, EU law generally refers to information or knowledge. Article 4(1) GDPR 2016/679 refers to personal data defined 
as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’; Article 2(3a) of the Public Sector Information Directive 
2003/98 refers to document defined as any content whatever its medium (written on paper or stored in electronic form or as a sound, 
visual or audio-visual recording); Article 3(1) of the Free-flow of non-personal data Regulation 2018/1807 refers to data defined 
as data other than personal data as defined in the GDPR. 
18 As explained by Varian (2019). 
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as improving products or offerings.19 Going down the value chain, the efforts and investments by the data 
owner increase and may even be protected by intellectual property rights. Hence, the interest in protecting 
property and investment incentives, which is one part of the balance when deciding to impose access, 
increases. 
 
Figure 1: Data pyramid and the big data value chain 
 





Source: Adapted from Gal and Rubinfeld (2019) and Varian (2019) 
 
In practice, a request for data access may take place at different levels of the value chain. An access seeker 
may request access to raw data and then carry out other downstream operations, i.e. structure, analyse and 
use the data. An access seeker may also request access to the structure and then possibly collect and analyse 
the data. The access seeker may also ask access to the full suite (i.e. the data collected, structured and 
analysed) to take their own course of action. 
 
- Characteristics of data and competitive dynamics of the data economy 
 
Data and big data have been characterised in many ways20 but the one proposed by the OECD (2015:179) 
is one of the best: data constitute an infrastructure or infrastructural resources that meet the following 
criteria.  
- Data are a non-rivalrous good as they can be shared without losing their value, hence data access 
is often equated to data sharing; 
- Data are a capital good as they are often used as an input in developing other products. This is 
particularly the case for machine learning where data are the raw material for the algorithm;  
- Data are a general-purpose input21 that can be used and re-used to develop different products, for 
instance the same behavioural data can be used to develop a fraud detection algorithm or a tastes 
prediction algorithm.22 
 
The collection, structuring or the analysis of data may be subject to legal, technological and economic entry 
barriers. For data collection, legal barriers may be found in legislation (in particular privacy laws that strictly 
regulate the collection of personal data) or in contracts that may contain exclusivity clauses prohibiting data 
transfer.23 Barriers may also be technical, for instance when data are encrypted. Finally, barriers may be 
economic when collecting data present economies of scale and scope or network effects. This is often the 
case in practice as many data are collected, in multi-sided market settings, against ‘free’ services that exhibit 
important network effects.24 For instance, it is easier and less costly for a large social network such as 
                                                 
19 Gal and Rubinfeld (2019) mentioned an additional link of data storage which is not mentioned here. See also de Streel (2018). 
20 Cyril Ritter presented a long list of different data characterisations: beautiful, everywhere, the new oil, truth, the new currency, 
the new gold, the new electricity, the new air, the new coal, the new champagne, like water, like sunshine, like silk, like a bikini, 
like teenage sex, like astrology, like garbage, like waste, like toxic waste, like nuclear waste. 
21 Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) give the three main characteristics of general-purpose technologies: pervasiveness, the 
inherent potential for technical improvements and the innovational complementarities of the former 
22 This is in particular the case in the digital sector where innovation is often based on different modules that are multi-purposes: 
Bourreau and de Streel (2019).  
23 See Osborne Clark (2016). 
24 Next to the network effects for data collection alone, there are some monetisation and customer feedback loops between data 
collection and data analysis which may increase even further the entry barriers in data collection: see Lerner (2014). As always, 
the effects of those feedback loops is an empirical issue that should be analysed on a case-by-case: de Streel (2018). 
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Facebook to collect users’ data because they can attract users more easily given the direct network effects. 
Similarly, it is less costly for a large search engine such as Google to attract more search queries because 
they can attract users more easily given the indirect network effects.25 
 
With regard to data structuring, legal barriers may be found in legislation protecting property(-like) rights 
(such as database or trade secrets)26 or in contracts. Barriers may also be technical, for instance when 
structured data are not interoperable.27 Finally, barriers may be economic because the data structures often 
exhibit important network effects as ‘they allow data to be communicated between different market players 
active at different level of the value chain’.28 For instance, the 1860 brick structure of IMS-Health had 
become a de facto industry standard. 
 
Regarding data analysis, barriers may be legal, in particular privacy laws that limit data processing. Barriers 
are often economic because big data analysis exhibits important economies of scale and scope. The level 
of economies of scale (the volume of the data) is not easy to determine and depends very much on the type 
of data and the type of analysis as shown by Junqué de Fortuny et al. (2013). For instance, for search 
algorithm. Microsoft argued, in Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, that with larger scale a search engine 
can run tests on how to improve the algorithm and that it is possible to experiment more and faster as traffic 
volume increases because experimental traffic will take up a smaller proportion of overall traffic.29 
Economies of scope (the variety of data) may be even more important than economies of scale but they are 
equally difficult to assess.30 Already in Google/DoubleClick, the Commission observed that: ‘competition 
based on the quality of collected data thus is not only decided by virtue of the sheer size of the respective 
databases, but also determined by the different types of data the competitors have access to and the question 
which type eventually will prove to be the most useful for internet advertising purposes.’31 
 
2. Limits to data sharing 
 
Competition, personal data protection and consumer law can, to some extent, limit data sharing. Indeed, 
competition law might intervene to sanction data pooling initiatives, or to prevent the combination of 
datasets through merger, entailing competition concerns. Moreover, the principles of purpose limitation and 
data minimisation contained in the General Data Protection Regulation32 (hereafter “GDPR”) might also 
limit data sharing. Additionally, consumer law can also restrict data sharing. 
 
2.1. Data pooling and collusion concerns  
                                                 
25 Prufer and Schottmuller (2017). 
26 Directive 96/9 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, OJ [1996] 
L 77/20; Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-
how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, OJ [2016] L 157/1. See Drexl 
(2016:19-30). 
27 Deloitte et al. (2018). Kerber and Schweitzer (2017:40) define interoperability as: ‘the ability of a system, product or service to 
communicate and function with other (technically different) systems, products or services’. Varian (2019) observes that: 
‘Constructing this data pipeline is often the most labor intensive and expensive part of building a data infrastructure, since different 
businesses often have idiosyncratic legacy systems that are difficult to interconnect’. 
28 Drexl (2016:54). 
29 Commission Decision of 18 February 2010, Case M. 5727 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, par. 162 and 223. Lerner 
(2014:37), Lambrecht and Trucker (2015:10) or Sokol and Comerford (2016) submit that the scale economies are low even for tail 
queries and that there is a diminishing marginal return of data both for head and tail queries while Mc Afee (2015) cautious that 
more data matters for tail queries. 
30 The UK Information Commissioner’s Office (2014, para 25) observes that variety is the most important characteristic of big 
data. 
31 Commission Decision of 11 March 2008, Case M.4731 Google/ DoubleClick, para. 273.  
32 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 
4 May 2016. 




Sharing of commercially sensitive information among competitors can violate Article 101 TFEU, which 
prohibits restrictive agreements and concerted practices. How Article 101 TFEU is to be applied to data 
pooling arrangements, whereby firms agree to share information among each other relating to a particular 
market, service or industry,33 is not yet clear. Article 101 TFEU can stand in the way of data sharing in 
situations where the exchange of information among competitors gives rise to collusion under Article 
101(1) TFEU and the resulting restriction of competition cannot be justified under Article 101(3) TFEU by 
showing that the procompetitive effects outweigh the anticompetitive effects.  
 
In Asnef-Equifax, the Court of Justice was asked to assess the compatibility with Article 101 TFEU of a 
register set up by financial institutions in Spain involving the exchange of solvency and credit information 
about their customers in order to evaluate the risks of engaging in lending and credit activities. The Court 
argued that in order not to restrict competition under Article 101 TFEU: (1) the relevant market at stake 
should not be highly concentrated; (2) the register should not be capable of revealing the identity of the 
lenders, as this could help to identify the market position or commercial strategy of competitors; and (3) 
the register should be accessible in a non-discriminatory manner to all operators active in the relevant 
sphere, so that some operators are not put at a disadvantage if they do not have access to information needed 
for risk assessment.34 These three conditions could also be applied to assess data pooling arrangements 
where information about individual customers is shared among market players. 
 
The Commission Horizontal Agreements Guidelines pay attention to how certain factors can make the 
exchange of information among competitors more problematic, including the strategic nature of the 
information, the market coverage of the firms involved, the individualised or aggregated nature of the 
company information exchanged, the age of the data, the frequency of the information exchange, the public 
or non-public nature of the information, and whether the exchange of information is public or non-public.35  
 
Most illustrative is the investigation the Commission opened in May 2019 into the data pooling system of 
Insurance Ireland, which is an association bringing together companies active in the insurance sector in 
Ireland. As part of its activities, Insurance Ireland administers a database to which member companies 
contribute insurance claims data on an ongoing basis. According to the Commission’s press release, the 
objective of the system is “to facilitate the detection of potentially fraudulent behaviour by insurance 
claimants and to ensure the accuracy of information provided by potential customers to insurance 
companies and/or their agents”.36 While the Commission acknowledges that such a data pooling system 
may benefit consumers by ensuring more suitable products and competitive prices, it is concerned in 
particular about whether the conditions of access to the system of Insurance Ireland restrict competition and 
thereby reduce Irish drivers’ choice of insurance policies.37 
 
Apart from listing the factual circumstances of the case, the press release also provides a more general 
background as to the Commission’s current thinking about data pooling. The Commission states that data 
pooling arrangements are often pro-competitive: (1) they directly benefit consumers by enabling effective 
competition on the market, as service providers may be able to offer better prices and services to consumers 
by accessing and participating in a data pool; and (2) access to data in a data pool may enable effective 
market entry, resulting into improved choice of services and suppliers to the benefit of consumers. 
                                                 
33 This is the definition used by Lundqvist, see B. Lundqvist, ‘Competition and Data Pools’, Journal of European Consumer and 
Market Law 2018, p. 146. 
34 Case C‑238/05 Asnef-Equifax, EU:C:2006:734, par. 58-61. 
35 Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal 
co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, par. 86-94. 
36 Press release European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission opens investigation into Insurance Ireland data pooling system’, 
14 May 2019, available at https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2509_en.htm. 
37 Ibidem. 
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However, the Commission also points out that data pooling arrangements may in some situations lead to 
restrictions of competition, for instance when: (1) the conditions of access to and participation in a data 
pool result in placing certain market players at a competitive disadvantage; or (2) the data pooling system 
enables market players to become aware of the market strategies of their competitors.38 The Commission 
intends to launch a review of its Guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements (Horizontal Guidelines), 
which provide the general principles on how to assess information exchanges among competitors. This 
review takes place against the background of the upcoming expiry of the Research & Development Block 
Exemption Regulation and the Specialisation Block Exemption Regulation.39  
 
Beyond restrictions on access to the pool on which the investigation of the Commission against Insurance 
Ireland focuses, another question is when the existence of data pooling arrangements in themselves can 
breach Article 101 TFEU through the exchange of commercially sensitive information among competitors. 
In this regard, Lundqvist makes a distinction between three situations. Whereas exchange of technical 
information for the development of new products or interoperability among existing products through a 
data pool seems largely unproblematic, data pooling arrangements where parties share strategic and 
competitive information regarding prices or new innovations have to be considered as potentially breaching 
Article 101 TFEU. Within those two extremes lie data pools in which not directly commercially sensitive 
information is shared but where information is exchanged about a large number of customers in a way that 
may ultimately enable a member to the pool to extract competitive insights based on data analytics.40  
In its upcoming revision of the Horizontal Guidelines, the Commission will likely and hopefully clarify 
how these existing indicators have to be applied to assess the more complicated data pooling arrangements 
where possible anticompetitive effects are less pronounced than in previous cases. Finally, the exchange of 
data among competitors can also take another shape.  
 
Reference can be made in this regard to the investigation that the Commission opened against Amazon in 
July 2019. According to the press release, the Commission will assess whether Amazon’s use of sensitive 
information from independent retailers violates Article 101 and 102 TFEU considering its dual role as a 
retailer and provider of a marketplace where it competes with the independent retailers.41 Although Amazon 
does not negotiate these agreements but imposes them as standard contracts on independent retailers, the 
investigation can shed further light on the boundaries of competition liability for the exchange of 
commercially sensitive information among competitors. 
 
2.2. Combination of datasets in mergers and competition concerns42 
 
The EU Merger Regulation can stand in the way of data sharing between merging parties when the 
combination of previously separate datasets would “significantly impede effective competition […] in 
particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position”.43 The European Commission 
has analysed competition concerns relating to the combination of data a number of times in merger 
decisions. So far, the Commission has not yet blocked a merger on the ground that the combination of data 
would give rise to competition concerns. Nevertheless, Competition Commissioner Vestager does refer to 
the possibility that data concentration can constitute a basis for a competition case in her public statements. 
For instance, in a February 2019 speech she stated: “[c]ompetition can’t work if just a few companies control 
a vital resource that you need to be able to compete – and if they refuse to share it with others. Right now, 
                                                 
38 Ibidem 
39 Ibidem 
40 Lundqvist (2018:150). 
41 Press release European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission opens investigation into possible anti-competitive conduct of 
Amazon’, 17 July 2019, available at https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-4291_en.htm. 
42 This section is partly based on Graef (2018b).  
43 Article 2(3) of Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (Merger 
Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1. 
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it looks as though data is becoming one of those vital resources. And if that’s so in a particular case, then 
we need to make sure it’s not monopolised by a few”.44 
 
In its 2007 Google/DoubleClick merger decision, the Commission argued that the combination of Google’s 
data on users’ search behaviour with DoubleClick’s data on web-browsing behaviour of users would not 
give the merged entity a competitive advantage that could not be matched by competitors.45 According to 
the Commission, such a combination of information was already available to a number of Google’s 
competitors, including Microsoft and Yahoo which both ran search engines and offered ad serving at that 
time as well. In addition, the Commission argued that competitors could purchase data or targeting services 
from third parties including portals, other major web publishers and internet service providers.46  
 
In 2014, the Commission analysed data-related competition concerns in Facebook/WhatsApp. According 
to the Commission, the acquisition of WhatsApp would not increase the amount of data potentially available 
to Facebook for advertising purposes because WhatsApp did not collect data valuable for advertising 
purposes at the time of the merger.47 The Commission still investigated possible theories of harm relating 
to data concentration to the extent that it was likely to strengthen Facebook’s position in the market for 
online advertising. In this regard, the Commission argued that the merger would not raise competition 
concerns even if Facebook would introduce targeted advertising on WhatsApp or start collecting data from 
WhatsApp users with a view to improving the accuracy of the targeted ads served on Facebook’s social 
networking platform.48 In the Commission’s view, there would continue to be a sufficient number of 
alternative providers to Facebook for the supply of targeted advertising after the merger, and a large amount 
of internet user data that are valuable for advertising purposes were not within Facebook’s exclusive 
control. In particular, the Commission considered Google, Apple, Amazon, eBay, Microsoft, AOL, Yahoo!, 
Twitter, IAC, LinkedIn, Adobe and Yelp as market participants that collect user data alongside Facebook.49  
Whereas the Commission in Facebook/WhatsApp had not defined a possible market for data or data 
analytics services on the ground that “neither of the Parties is currently active in any such potential 
markets”,50 an evolution is visible in Microsoft/LinkedIn. Under the assumption that such data combination 
is allowed under the applicable data protection legislation, the Commission distinguished two main ways 
in which the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger could raise competition concerns as a result of the combination of 
data. First, the Commission acknowledged that the combination of two datasets as a result of a merger may 
“increase the merged entity’s market power in a hypothetical market for the supply of this data or increase 
barriers to entry/expansion in the market for actual or potential competitors, which may need this data to 
operate on this market”. Second, the Commission made clear that, even if there is no intention or technical 
possibility to combine the two datasets, “it may be that pre-merger the two companies were competing with 
                                                 
44 Speech Competition Commissioner Vestager, ‘Making the data revolution work for us’, Mackenzie Stuart Lecture, Cambridge, 
4 February 2019, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/making-data-
revolution-work-us_en. 
45 Case COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, par. 366. 
46 Case COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, par. 269-272 and 365. 
47 Case COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, par. 166. 
48 In May 2017, the Commission imposed a 110 million euro fine on Facebook for providing misleading information during the 
merger investigation. While Facebook had informed the Commission that it would be unable to establish reliable automated 
matching between Facebook users’ accounts and WhatsApp users’ accounts, WhatsApp announced updates to its terms of service 
in August 2016 including the possibility of linking WhatsApp users’ phone numbers with Facebook users’ identities. However, the 
fact that misleading information was given did not impact the 2014 authorisation of the transaction as the decision was based on a 
number of elements going beyond automated user matching and the Commission at the time carried out an ‘even if’ assessment 
assuming user matching as a possibility (Press release European Commission, ‘Mergers: Commission fines Facebook €110 million 
for providing misleading information about WhatsApp takeover’, 18 May 2017, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-1369_en.htm). 
49 Case COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, par. 187-190. 
50 Ibidem, par. 72. 
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each other on the basis of the data they controlled and this competition would be eliminated by the 
merger”.51  
 
These two ways distinguished in Microsoft/LinkedIn as to how a combination of data may raise competition 
concerns in a merger have also been referred to by the Commission as the relevant legal framework in its 
Verizon/Yahoo merger decision.52 Despite this evolution in approach, the Commission nevertheless came 
to the same conclusion in Microsoft/LinkedIn as in Google/DoubleClick and Facebook/WhatsApp, namely 
that the combination of data enabled did not raise serious doubts as to the merger’s compatibility with the 
internal market in relation to online advertising.53 The Commission specified three grounds for this. First, 
Microsoft and LinkedIn did not make available their data to third parties for advertising purposes, with only 
very limited exceptions. Second, the combination of their respective datasets did not appear to result in 
raising the barriers to entry/expansion for other players in this space, as there would continue to be a large 
amount of internet user data that were valuable for advertising purposes and that were not within 
Microsoft’s exclusive control. Third, the merging parties were small market players and competed with 
each other only to a very limited extent in online advertising and its possible segments.54  
 
In its 2018 Apple/Shazam merger decision, the Commission again reached the conclusion that the 
combination of the datasets of the two companies would not give rise to competition concerns. This time 
the focus was not on online advertising but on digital music streaming apps where Apple is active with its 
Apple Music service and Shazam offers a leading music recognition application. According to the 
Commission, it would be unlikely that the merged entity would have the ability to foreclose competing 
providers of digital music streaming apps even if Shazam’s data would be integrated into Apple’s dataset. 
Shazam’s data, in the Commission’s view, does not seem to be an important input to improve existing 
functionalities or offer additional functionalities within digital music streaming apps, and does not appear 
to be unique based on a comparison with other alternative datasets in relation to the metrics associated with 
the Four V’s of big data, namely the variety of data, the speed at which the data is collected (velocity), the 
size of the dataset (volume), and its economic relevance (value).55 
 
The analysis of these data-related merger decisions shows that the Commission does not shy away from 
analysing the impact of the combination of data through a merger. Nevertheless, one can raise the question 
whether the reasoning of the Commission in these cases has always been credible considering the – often – 
general reference to the alleged wide availability of remaining data held by third parties without analysing 
the substitutability of the particular type of data affected in more detail. Even though we have not seen such 
cases yet, the Commission may decide to block the merger altogether or to impose remedies if a 
concentration of data in the hands of one entity would significantly impede effective competition in the 
relevant market. To address these competition concerns, the Commission could mandate the establishment 
of a firewall between the different datasets.56 Such a remedy would limit data sharing in an effort to protect 
against anticompetitive effects. As will be discussed in section 3, a remedy to address data-related 
competition concerns in a merger can interestingly also be designed as an enabler of data sharing when it 
involves a divestiture of data to a third party. 
                                                 
51 Case M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, 6 December 2016, par. 179. 
52 Case M.8180 – Verizon/Yahoo, 21 December 2016, par. 81-83. 
53 The Commission reached the same conclusion in Verizon/Yahoo, see Case M.8180 – Verizon/Yahoo, 21 December 2016, par. 
89-93. 
54 Case M.8124 – Microsoft / LinkedIn, 6 December 2016, par. 180. The Commission similarly investigated a hypothetical market 
for data in two other instances in the Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, namely in the context of customer relationship management 
software solutions and with regard to the use of data for machine learning in productivity software solutions. For both instances, 
the Commission concluded that the transaction did not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market. See 
Case M.8124 – Microsoft / LinkedIn, 6 December 2016, par. 253-264 and 373-381. For an analysis, see Graef (2018b: 79-81). 
55 Case M.8788 – Apple/Shazam, 6 September 2018, par. 313-330. 
56 This is the remedy former FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour suggested in the US Google/DoubleClick merger. See her 
dissenting Statement in Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 071-0170, 20 December 2007, footnote 23 on page 9. 




2.3. Purpose limitation and data minimisation principles in the GDPR 
 
The processing57 of personal data, defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person”58, is regulated by the GDPR. As data sharing might entail the exchange of personal data, 
which is considered as an act of processing falling under the scope of the GDPR, this Regulation has to be 
taken into account. While the GDPR does not forbid, as such, the sharing of personal data, it nevertheless 
limits the possibilities of data sharing. This is because this instrument aims at reaching an equilibrium 
between the fundamental right of the protection of personal data, on the one hand, and the fundamental 
right of the freedom to conduct a business, on the other hand.59 To do so, the GDPR gives to the data 
subjects60 a form of control over “their” personal data, and subjects the processing of personal data by 
controllers61 to several principles contained in Article 5 of the GDPR. Two of these principles potentially 
limit data sharing, namely the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation.62 
 
According to the purpose limitation principle, personal data can only be processed for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes, and cannot be further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those 
purposes.63 This means that data that has been collected for a specific purpose cannot be shared with third 
parties if this act of sharing does not fit within this initial purpose. Because the act of sharing is a new 
processing activity, distinct from the initial one, it requires a lawful basis.64 However, according to Article 
6.4 of the GDPR, a separate lawful basis is only necessary if the new purpose (in casu the data sharing) is 
not compatible with the initial purpose for which the data has been collected. Conversely, according to 
Recital 50 of the GDPR, if this new purpose is compatible with the initial purpose, no separate lawful basis 
is required. To assess this compatibility, a key consideration will be whether the data subjects could have 
reasonably expected that the data holder would have shared this data. Yet, the affirmation that a separate 
lawful basis is not necessary if the further processing is compatible with the initial processing is 
controversial.65 
 
According to the data minimisation principle, only the adequate, relevant and necessary personal data for 
the fulfilment of a specific purpose can be processed.66 This implies that, even if the act of data sharing 
complies with the purpose limitation principle, the categories and amount of data that can be shared should 
nevertheless be limited to what is necessary to meet this purpose. This outlines the importance of clearly 
                                                 
57 “Any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated 
means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or 
destruction” (Article 4.2 of the GDPR). 
58 Article 4.1 of the GDPR. An identifiable natural person is “one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identifier”. This definition is further refined by Recital 26 of the GDPR: “To determine whether a natural person 
is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller 
or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be 
used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time 
required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological 
developments”. 
59 Recital 4 of the GDPR. Resp. Articles 8 and 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
60 “Any identified or identifiable natural person” (Article 4.1 of the GDPR). 
61 “The natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes 
and means of the processing of personal data” (Art. 4.7 of the GDPR). 
62 Article 5.1.b) and c) of the GDPR. 
63 Article 5.1.b) of the GDPR. 
64 These lawful bases are listed in Article 6 of the GDPR. 
65 Wendehorst (2017: 335-336). 
66 Article 5.1.c) of the GDPR. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3494212 
12 
 
defining the specific purpose of the data sharing, as the GDPR prevents “over-sharing”, i.e. sharing more 
data than what is relevant and necessary for the purpose of the processing. 
 
Outlining how these two principles of the GDPR might limit the sharing of personal data is important. 
Indeed, the notion of personal data is dynamic and ever-expanding67 and this creates uncertainties about the 
scope of the GDPR. Yet, the dichotomy between personal and non-personal data is broadly relied upon in 
the legal framework68. This can however be rather artificial in some cases, as it might not be easy to 
determine whether specific data should be considered as personal or not. This is even more so if one 
considers the constant development of Big Data69 analytics. Indeed, Big Data increases the possibility of 
"crossing" multiple data sets, to which it was previously more difficult to have access. This consequently 
exacerbates the risk of direct or indirect re-identification of a data subject on the basis of these data, whether 
by the controller or by a third party. In doing so, data considered at a time "T" as non-personal may thus, 
on the basis of technological developments in data analytics capabilities, become personal data at time 
"T+1". Therefore, as more and more data might be considered as being personal, the limitations on data 
sharing imposed by the purpose limitation and data minimisation principles of the GDPR could have a 
strong impact in practice. 
 
2.4. Consumer law 
 
The consumer law regime can impose obligations on traders restricting their ability to use or share data. 
According to the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, a non-individually negotiated contractual term is to be 
regarded as unfair if “contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer”.70 This could 
include terms that force consumers to share their data with a third party as illustrated by the actions taken 
against WhatsApp in Italy in May 2017. The Italian competition and consumer authority took two decisions 
imposing a fine of 3 million euro on WhatsApp for alleged unfair commercial practices and inclusion of 
unfair terms, including the provision forcing users to share their personal data with Facebook by making 
them believe that otherwise they would not have been able to continue using the service.71  
 
In November 2018, the Italian competition and consumer authority also imposed a fine on Facebook for 
misleading consumers into registering an account without adequately informing them of the commercial 
use of their data and for exerting undue influence on registered users who suffered from unconscious and 
automatic transmission of their data from Facebook to third parties for commercial purposes. The Italian 
authority qualified the latter conduct as an aggressive commercial practice. Even though consumers could 
limit their consent, they were then faced with significant restrictions on their use of Facebook’s social 
network and third-party websites which induced them to maintain the pre-selection by Facebook of the 
broadest consent to data sharing.72 
 
                                                 
67 Article 4.1 of the GDPR. 
68 For a criticism of this broad reliance on the personal versus non-personal data dichotomy, see: Graef, Gellert and Husovec, (2019: 
605-621). 
69 “"Big data" is a field that treats ways to analyze, systematically extract information from, or otherwise deal with data sets that 
are too large or complex to be dealt with by traditional data-processing application software” 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_data). 
70 Article 3(1) of Council Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L 95/29. 
71 Press release Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato, ‘WhatsApp fined for 3 million euro for having forced its users to 
share their personal data with Facebook’, 12 May 2017, available at https://en.agcm.it/en/media/press-releases/2017/5/alias-2380. 
For an analysis, see Zingales (2017: 557-558). 
72 Press release Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato, ‘Facebook fined 10 million Euros by the ICA for unfair 
commercial practices for using its subscribers’ data for commercial purposes’, 7 December 2018, available at 
https://en.agcm.it/en/media/press-releases/2018/12/Facebook-fined-10-million-Euros-by-the-ICA-for-unfair-commercial-
practices-for-using-its-subscribers%E2%80%99-data-for-commercial-purposes 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3494212 
13 
 
Another example of the relevance of consumer law is how Facebook updated its terms in April 2019 to 
clarify how it relies on users’ data to develop profiling activities and target advertising to finance its 
business as a result of the joint action by the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (a pan-European 
enforcement network bringing together national consumer authorities).73  
 
Even though consumer law thus does not limit data sharing as such, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive help to protect consumers by requiring transparency about 
the use of data in consumer contracts and by banning certain unfair commercial practices.  
 
3. Enablers of data sharing 
 
While competition, personal data protection and consumer law potentially limit data sharing, these regimes 
also enable data sharing. Indeed, competition law might impose the access to data under the essential 
facilities doctrine or as an antitrust remedy to ensure a level playing field. Moreover, personal data 
protection law enables data sharing via the right to data portability enshrined in Article 20 of the GDPR. 
Additionally, consumer law also enables data sharing as the underlying idea of Article 16 of the Digital 
Content Directive74 is to allow the consumers to retrieve their data from traders who provide them with 
digital content and digital services, in order to then share this data with other traders. 
 
3.1. Access to data under Article 102 TFEU and the essential facilities doctrine 
 
3.1.1. Cases so far 
 
Among the essential facilities cases reviewed in Section 2, three are information-related. In Magill, the 
Court of Justice validated the compulsory access to programme listings, data for which there was a legal 
barrier (the copyright) and which was a by-product of the main activities of the broadcasters. In IMS, the 
Court of Justice set the conditions to impose access to a structure for data which was a de facto industry 
standard. In Microsoft, the General Court validated the compulsory access to interoperability information 
which were also close to de facto industry standard.   
 
Next to those EU cases, two non-digital national cases, which are very similar, are interesting. In both cases, 
a firm uses a customer list developed when it enjoyed a legal monopoly to promote a new service allowing 
it to compete unfairly through data cross-subsidisation which “un-levels” the playing field between the 
former monopolist and the new entrants. The first case was decided by the French competition authority 
against the previous gas monopolist Gaz de France (now Engie) which was using its customers list to 
promote a new gas service. In an interim decision, the authority forced Gaz de France to share the list with 
its competitors on the gas market as such a database was developed under a legal monopoly and was not 
easily reproducible by new entrants.75 In the final decision, the authority imposed a fine of € 100 million 
on GDF.76 The second case was decided by the Belgian competition authority against the National Lottery 
which was using its customers lists to send a one-off promotional email to launch its new sports betting 
product.77 Given its nature and size, the authority concluded that the contact details could not have been 
                                                 
73 Press release European Commission, ‘Facebook changes its terms and clarify its use of data for consumers following discussions 
with the European Commission and consumer authorities’, 9 April 2019, available at https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-
2048_en.htm. 
74 Directive 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for 
the supply of digital content and digital services, OJ L 136/1, 22 May 2019. 
75 Decision 14-MC-02 of 9 September 2014 of the French Competition Authority, Direct Energie and UFC Que Choisir v. Engie. 
This decision is based on the opinion that the French competition authority had adopted in 2010: Opinion 10-A-13 of the French 
Competition Authority of 14 June 2010 on cross-use of customers database. 
76 Decision 17-D-06 of 31 March 2017 of the French Competition Authority, Direct Energie and UFC Que Choisir v. Engie. 
77 Decision 2015-P/K-27 of 22 September 2015 of the Belgian Competition Authority, Stanleybet Belgium/Stanley International 
Betting and Sagevas/World Football Association/Samenwerkende Nevenmaatschappij Belgische PMU v.  Nationale Loterij. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3494212 
14 
 
reproduced by competitors in the market under reasonable financial conditions and within a reasonable 
period of time.78 
 
In the digital sector, two American cases are also interesting. In both cases, a small firm was relying on the 
data of bigger digital platform to provide data analytics services and then, at some point, was cut off from 
the access to those data. In the first case, PeopleBrowsr analysed Twitter data to sell information about 
customer reactions to products or about Twitter influencers in certain communities. At some point, Twitter 
decided that its data will not anymore be accessible directly but should be bought from certified data 
resellers. Following a compliant by PeopleBrowsr, a Californian Court ordered, with interim measures, 
Twitter to continue to provide its data directly. Then the parties settled the case deciding that after a 
transition period, PeopleBrowser will get the data from the certified data resellers.79 In the second case, hiQ 
analysed LinkedIn public available data to provide information to business about their workforces. At some 
point, LinkedIn had limited access to its data with legal and technical means because it wanted to provide 
similar services itself. Following a compliant by hiQ, a US federal district judge ordered LinkedIn to resume 
the supply of its data.80 
 
3.2.2. Assessment of essential facilities conditions for data access 
 
When applying the four conditions of the essential facilities doctrine to data, it is important to distinguish 
at which level of the big data value chain access is requested (raw data, structure, structured data, analysed 
data). This will determine the upstream market on which indispensability is assessed and the downstream 
market on which the elimination of competition and the emergence of a new product are assessed. It is also 
important to apply those conditions in the light of the characteristics of data mentioned earlier. 
 
(i) Condition 1: Indispensability of data 
 
When access to raw data is requested, assessment of the indispensability condition implies an enquiry as to 
whether an alternative raw dataset is available or could be collected by a firm having the same size as the 
data owner. Obviously, this is an empirical analysis that should be examined on a case-by-case basis.81 The 
wide availability and the non-rivalry of data often do not make them indispensable as the Commission has 
concluded in several past merger cases.82 However in some cases, data collection may be subject to legal, 
technical and economic barriers which may make them indispensable.83 In addition, many collected data 
are often generated by the users themselves84 which may facilitate finding of indispensability according to 
IMS. Finally, the fact that the requested data have not already been traded, which is very often the case in 
practice, should not be an obstacle to imposing sharing as, following IMS, it suffices that there is demand 
and that such demand can legally and practically be met. 
 
When access is about data structure, the assessment of the indispensability condition implies an enquiry as 
to whether an alternative structure is available or could be built by a firm having the same size as the data 
structure owner. Again, this is an empirical issue, but data structuring may show important network effects 
and become a de facto industry standard as in IMS. Access may also be about structured data, i.e. the 
collected data and the structure. In this case, both assessments indicated are required. 
                                                 
78 Ibidem, par. 69-70. 
79 http://blog.peoplebrowsr.com/2012/11/peoplebrowsr-wins-temporary-restraining-order-compelling-twitter-to-provide-firehose-
access/ and http://blog.peoplebrowsr.com/2013/04/peoplebrowsr-and-twitter-settle-firehose-dispute/ 
80 HIQ Labs v. LinkedIn. 
81 This is why the conclusion of Lambrecht and Tucker (2015) that big data is not a sustainable competitive advantage (which is a 
strategic management which is close to the essential facility concept in antitrust) is not convincing because it is too general. 
82 See Balto and Lane (2016), Lambrecht and Tucker (2015), Lerner (2014), Sokol and Comerford (2016). 
83 Also Drexl (2016:49), Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), Stucke and Grunes (2016). 
84 For instance, in the connected cars, most data are generated by the driver (Kerber, 2018b:328). 




(ii) Condition 2: Elimination of effective competition in the downstream market 
 
The assessment of the elimination of downstream competition is very complex in the case of big data for 
two reasons. First, the downstream market is not always known, as one of the main features of big data is 
to experiment, crunch a lot of data without knowing in advance what information or knowledge will be 
found and what action might be taken. Therefore, the refusal to share data may lead to the possible 
elimination of a competitor on a not-yet-defined and future market85. This requires a more dynamic analysis, 
better in line with market realities but more difficult to do and possibly increasing the risks of antitrust 
errors. 
 
Second, the data owner is often not (yet) active on the downstream market because, as explained by Drexl 
(2016:49): ‘a typical feature of the data economy is that data is collected for one purpose but may turn out 
to be interesting for very different purposes pursued by other firms of very different sectors.’ As explained 
above, authors are divided on whether the second condition requires the presence of the data owner on the 
downstream market and the case law is not clear. Given the firms’ strategies and the competitive dynamics 
in the data economy, not requiring the presence of the data owner on the downstream market is suggested. 
The evolution of digital industries is quick and uncertain, and many firms are “paranoid” about the next 
disruptive innovation.86 Thus, a data owner may refuse to share data with a firm that is not (yet) a competitor 
either because it plans to enter in the downstream market (future offensive leverage) or because it fears that 
the data seeker will disrupt its business (defensive leverage). In short, given the characteristics of the data 
economy, refusal to deal while not being active on the downstream market is not necessarily exploitative 
and may well be exclusionary. Again, much more dynamic analysis would be better aligned with market 
realities but would be difficult to do. 
 
(iii) Condition 3: New product and consumer harm 
 
As explained above, the interpretation of this condition is not very clear. The European Courts link this 
condition to the protection of the facility by an intellectual property right but have applied it more strictly 
in some cases than in others. The Commission integrates this condition into a more general consumer harm 
assessment.  
 
Taking the Courts interpretation, the first issue is thus to determine whether the data to which access is 
required are protected by IP rights. That will depend, among other things, on the level in the value chain at 
which access is required. If there is IP protection, the next issue is whether the product that the access seeker 
aims to bring on the downstream market is sufficiently new or, at least improved, compared to the data 
owner’s products. Drexl (2016:52) is doubtful that that will often be the case as he considers that the 
generation of new information thanks to data sharing is often not sufficiently innovative to justify the 
compulsory licensing of the intellectual property right. 
 
However, more fundamentally, the assessment of this condition faces the same two difficulties analysed 
previously for the second condition, i.e. the product to be offered by the access seeker is often still unknown 
and the facility owner is often not (yet) providing a competing product. Therefore, the more general 
consumer harm approach proposed by the Commission is more appropriate to the characteristics of the data 
economy. Thus, the competition authority will have to examine whether, for consumers, the likely negative 
                                                 
85 Keber (2018b:321) shows, in the context of connected cars, that the uncertainty on the future use of data also make difficult the 
reliance of the aftermarket theory. 
86 Andy Grove, the iconic founder of Intel, wrote in 1999 a book that he famously titled: Only the paranoid will survive. On 
disruptive innovation, see Gans (2016). 
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consequences of the refusal to share data outweigh, over time, the negative consequences of imposing data 
sharing.87 
 
(iv) Condition 4: No objective justification and efficiencies 
 
The last condition covers the economic and non-economic defence that the dominant data owner may 
oppose to compulsory data sharing. The data owner could show that compulsory sharing would undermine 
its incentives to collect, structure or analyse data (depending on the level at which the access is required). 
As investment increases going down the big data value chain, the lower level the access is required, the 
more investment incentives need to be protected. As already explained, this justification is connected to 
main cost-benefit analysis at the basis of imposing duty to deal. The data owner could also show that 
compulsory sharing would violate some privacy laws (which may be the case if personal data were to be 
shared), undermine safety or security (which may be the case for financial data or data related to connected 
cars),88 or not be technically possible. For all those justifications, a proportionality test needs to be applied. 
 
Thus, the four conditions of the essential facilities should be applied considering the characteristics of the 
data and the competitive dynamics of the data economy. In some circumstances, they may be fulfilled and 
justify an antitrust compulsory data sharing order. However, those conditions are sufficient but not 
necessary to prove the exceptional circumstances justifying the imposition of a duty to deal under Article 
102 TFEU. They are merely proxies for the fundamental cost-benefit analysis described below. 
 
(v) Balancing interests with data 
 
The key issue is to determine whether the benefits of compulsory data sharing outweigh its costs.89 The 
benefits are created by the entry of the data access seeker that may bring more competition, follow-on or 
breakthrough innovation, diversity and choice to the secondary market. The costs are the reduced 
investment incentives for the facility owner and for the potential access seeker and the operation costs of 
the antitrust enforcers and the dominant firms that have to implement the access obligations. 
 
Those benefits and costs largely depend on the characteristics of data. The benefits of data sharing may be 
higher than for other (single-purpose) inputs because data are general-purpose and may be used and re-used 
in several contexts to build different information and knowledge.90 Conversely, the costs of data sharing on 
investment incentives may be lower than for other (rival) inputs because data are non-rivalrous and the data 
owner may keep them while sharing them, hence its incentives to collect, structure or analyse them remain 
unchanged. Such incentive costs may even be zero when the data were obtained as by-product of another 
activity done independently of the data collection, as was the case in Magill. 91 In this hypothesis, the value 
of the data amounts to a windfall gain for its owner. The incentive costs will also be reduced when the data 
were constituted under the protection of a legal monopoly as in Gaz de France or in the Belgian National 
Lottery.92 
 
The cost and benefit analysis also depend on the competitive dynamics in the data economy. Data markets 
show important economies of scale and scope on the supply side and massive direct and indirect network 
                                                 
87 To paraphrase para 86 of the Priorities Guidance. 
88 Kerber (2018b:318-319). 
89 Kerber (2018b). 
90 Also Abrahamson (2014:879) 
91 Graef (2016), Prufer and Schottmuller (2017), Rubinfeld and Gal (2017:377); Schweitzer et al. (2018). 
92 In those two national cases, we may also claim that the customers list was also a by-product to the core activities of the data 
owner. 
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effects on the demand side.93 This leads the markets to tip more often than in other sectors of the economy, 
which implies that competition enforcement should focus on preserving the contestability of those market 
for which data sharing may be key. Data markets also show rapid and uncertain innovation often after 
extensive experimentation. This requires better understanding of the firms’ strategies that may for instance 
terminate data sharing to free ride on the experimentation costs or refuse to share data to alleviate the risks 
of future disruption. 
 
Therefore, applying the same cost-benefit analysis which is at the core of the antitrust case-law of duty to 
deal in light of the different characteristics of data and the competitive strategies and dynamics of the data 
economy, leads us to suggest that the threshold for imposing data sharing under Article 102 TFEU should 
be lower than the threshold to impose access to other products.94 However, lower threshold does not mean 
no threshold, as the freedom to contract and right of propriety still need to be protected in the data economy. 
As in the other sectors of the economy, the antitrust agency should convincingly demonstrate that the 
benefits of sharing data outweigh its costs.   
 
3.2. Data sharing as antitrust remedy to ensure a level playing field  
 
In the previous section, we have discussed how the combination of data through a merger can lead to 
competition concerns and thereby limit data sharing when a remedy would require the merging parties to 
keep their datasets separate. Interestingly, merger review can at the same time be used to impose remedies 
that would enable data sharing for the same reason of addressing the competition concerns arising from a 
merger. Indeed, when the level of data concentration enabled by a merger significantly impedes effective 
competition, two types of approaches can be taken. To address the competition concerns, either the datasets 
involved are to be kept separate, which limits data sharing among the merged parties, or the data is to be 
divested to a third party, which would enable data sharing beyond the merging parties. The reasoning behind 
the latter approach is that by requiring the merging parties to divest or even duplicate the relevant data, 
competitors are to develop competing or complementary services so to keep the relevant market competitive 
after the merger.95 Precedent for such a remedy can be found in the context of the acquisition of Reuters by 
Thomson in 2008 where the Commission approved the merger on the condition that the merging parties 
would divest copies of their databases containing financial information.96 
 
Beyond cases where refusals to give access to data amount to abuse of dominance (as analysed in the sub-
section above), other types of abuses may also be addressed by imposing remedies that enable data sharing. 
The 2019 report on ‘Competition policy for the digital era’ written by the three experts appointed by 
Competition Commissioner Vestager suggested data access as a restorative remedy in cases of self-
preferencing.97 Self-preferencing is behaviour whereby a dominant firm gives more favourable treatment 
or more prominence to its own affiliated services versus those of rivals. A question is whether requiring a 
dominant firm to discontinue the abusive self-preferencing is sufficient to restore effective competition in 
the relevant market, considering that the self-preferencing has significantly benefited the market position 
the dominant firm’s service in relation to competitors. As examples of restorative remedies that would allow 
disadvantaged competitors to regain strength, the experts refer to the possibility of giving competitors 
“access to the dominant platform’s competitively relevant data resources or otherwise compensate for their 
                                                 
93 As explained in Bourreau and de Streel (2019), such characteristics of the data markets amplify the pro and anti-competitive 
effects of firms’ behaviours such as refusal to share. 
94 Also calling for lower threshold, Abrahamson (2014), Kerber (2018:328), Meadows (2015); Schweitzer et al. (2018). OECD 
(2015) goes also in the same direction. 
95 N.-P. SCHEPP AND A. WAMBACH, "On Big Data and Its Relevance for Market Power Assessment", Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 2016, vol. 7, no. 2, (120), p. 123. 
96 Case COMP/M.4726 – Thomson Corporation/Reuters Group, 19 February 2008. 
97 Crémer, de Montjoye and Schweitzer (2019:68). 
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reduced visibility or lack of data access in the past”.98 As a result, remedies that will enable data sharing 
can also be imposed in the context of other types of abuse of dominance cases beyond refusals to give 
access to data when the identified competition concerns can be addressed through mandatory data sharing. 
This includes the sharing or provision of access to data by the dominant firm to competitors but also to 
consumers. For instance, one can envisage a competition authority imposing a remedy to enable data 
portability (to which the attention turns in the next section) in an effort to address an exploitative abuse 
consisting of the excessive extraction of personal data from consumers.99 
 
3.3. Right to data portability in the GDPR 
 
One of the novelties of the GDPR has been the introduction of a data portability right in its Article 20. The 
goal of this right is to strengthen the “data subject empowerment”, i.e. the power of control that the data 
subjects have on their own personal data.100 To do so, Article 20.1 of the GDPR provides that the data 
subjects shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning them, which they have provided to a 
controller (the original controller), in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have 
the right to transmit those data to another controller (the recipient controller) without hindrance from the 
original controller. For instance, the data subject should have the possibility to extract his list of contacts 
from his webmail application in order to build a wedding invitation list that he can then share with his 
wedding planner.101 The scope of this right is however limited to specific categories of personal data 
processing and to certain specific categories of personal data. 
 
Data subjects can only call upon their data portability right for processing carried out by automated means, 
and which are based either on the data subjects’ consent or are necessary for the performance of a 
contract.102 There is thus no general right to data portability, since this right does not apply to processing 
operations necessary for the performance of a task in the public interest vested in the controller, nor to 
processing operations necessary for the compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is 
subject.103 For instance, a financial institution has no obligation to respond to a portability request relating 
to personal data that has been collected in the context of the compliance with its legal obligation to fight 
money laundering.104 
 
Moreover, data portability does not allow sharing all types of personal data, but only the personal data 
“provided” by the data subject to the original controller. According to the Article 29 Working Party 
guidelines (which are not legally binding but have an authoritative status), “provided” personal data are 
“data actively and knowingly provided by the data subject”105 (name, age, email address…) and “observed 
data provided by the data subject by virtue of the use of the service or the device [of the data controller]”106 
(search history, traffic and localisation data, number of steps walked during the day…).107 However, in the 
view of the Article 29 Working Party, personal data cannot be considered as “provided” if it involves 
“inferred data and derived data (…) created by the data controller on the basis of the data provided by the 
                                                 
98 Ibidem. 
99 Costa-Cabral (2016: 511) 
100 Working Party 29, Guidelines on the right to data portability, WP 242 rev.01, 13 April 2017, p. 4. 
101 Ibid., p. 5. 
102 Article 20.1 of the GDPR. 
103 Article 20.3 and Recital 68 of the GDPR.  
104 Working Party 29, Guidelines on the right to data portability, WP 242 rev.01, 13 April 2017, p. 8. 
105 Ibid., p. 10. 
106 Ibidem. 
107 The inclusion of these observed data in the scope of the “provided” data is criticised by some. See D. Meyer, “European 
Commission experts uneasy over WP29 data portability interpretation”, 25 April 2017, available at 
https://iapp.org/news/a/european-commission-experts-uneasy-over-wp29-data-portability-interpretation-1/. 
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data subject”108 (user profiles, results of an evaluation of the data subject’s health based on the data 
collected by his smart watch…). 
Article 20.2 of the GDPR goes a step further in terms of enabling data sharing as it provides that the data 
subject shall have the right to have the personal data transmitted directly from one controller to another. In 
essence, this means that the recipient controller can port data directly from the original controller’s system, 
provided that the data subject has consented to this operation. Therefore, the data does not have to transit 
through the data subject’s IT system. However, Article 20.2 of the GDPR only applies “where technically 
feasible”, which means that the original controllers have no obligation to ensure this technical feasibility, 
thus limiting this provision’s efficiency in practice. In this regard, it should be noted that Google, Facebook, 
Microsoft and Twitter contribute, with other actors, to the Data Transfer Project, launched in 2017, which 
aims at creating an open source platform allowing the direct portability of data between the participating 
data controllers.109 
 
Additionally, it should be pointed out that the Second Payment Service Directive110 (hereafter “PSD2”) 
provides for a sector-specific application of Article 20.2 of the GDPR.111 Indeed, PSD2 gives the right to 
providers of payment initiation service and providers of account information service112 to have access to 
the payment account information113 of the users of their services (the consumers), if the latter have explicitly 
consented to such access.114 This constitutes a sector-specific application of Article 20.2 of the GDPR, as 
it compels the banks (original controllers) to make this direct transmission of the data subjects’ personal 
banking information to recipient controllers “technically feasible”. This is the main difference with Article 
20.2 of the GDPR, which contains no such technical feasibility obligation. At the same time, the scope of 
the access mandated by the PSD2 is limited to the two scenarios of payment initiation and account 
information, whereas the GDPR’s data portability right applies generally irrespective of the type of service 
for which the data will be used. 
 
3.4. Data retrieval under the Digital Content Directive 
 
Like competition and personal data protection law, consumer law also enables data sharing, notably through 
the means of Article 16 of the Digital Content Directive.115 This provision allows consumers to retrieve 
some of the data they have provided to a trader116. More specifically, this Directive provides that, in the 
event of the termination of the contract, the trader shall, at the request of the consumer, make available to 
the consumer any content other than personal data, which was provided or created by the consumer when 
using the digital content or digital service supplied by the trader.117 The consumer shall be entitled to 
                                                 
108 Working Party 29, Guidelines on the right to data portability, WP 242 rev.01, 13 April 2017, p. 10. 
109 See https://datatransferproject.dev/. 
110 Directive 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal 
market, , OJ L 337/35, 23 December 2015. 
111 Colangelo and Borgogno (2018:3); Vezzoso (2018:12-13). 
112 Respectively defined as “a service to initiate a payment order at the request of the payment service user with respect to a 
payment account held at another payment service provider” and as “an online service to provide consolidated information on one 
or more payment accounts held by the payment service user with either another payment service provider or with more than one 
payment service provider” (Articles 4.15 and 4.16 of the Directive 2015/2366). 
113 Defined as “account held in the name of one or more payment service users which is used for the execution of payment 
transactions” (Article 4.12 of the Directive 2015/2366). 
114 Articles 64 to 67 of the Directive 2015/2366. 
115 Directive 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for 
the supply of digital content and digital services, OJ L 136/1, 22 May 2019. 
116 A trader is defined as “Any natural or legal person, irrespective of whether privately or publicly owned, that is acting, including 
through any other person acting in that natural or legal person's name or on that person's behalf, for purposes relating to that 
person's trade, business, craft, or profession, in relation to contracts covered by this Directive” (Article 2.5 of the Directive 
2019/770). 
117 Article 16.4, al. 1 of the Directive 2019/770. 
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retrieve that digital content free of charge, without hindrance from the trader, within a reasonable time and 
in a commonly used and machine-readable format.118  
 
The Directive therefore grants a form of portability right for the non-personal data provided or created by 
the consumer. However, this right for consumers, or duty imposed on traders, does not apply in a number 
of situations, namely where data: (1) has no utility outside the context of the digital content or digital service 
supplied by the trader; (2) only relates to the consumer's activity when using the digital content or digital 
service supplied by the trader; or (3) has been aggregated with other data by the trader and cannot be 
disaggregated or only with disproportionate efforts.119 These exceptions are justified by the fact that, in 
those cases, the content is of little practical use to the consumer, who therefore has a limited interest in the 
portability of such data, particularly in view of the fact that requiring such a mechanism is costly for the 
trader.120 
 
Yet, the Directive is only an indirect enabler of data sharing as it solely provides the consumer with a right 
to retrieve some of its non-personal data. It does not allow the direct transmission of data between two 
traders. Nevertheless, the underlying idea of the Directive is to allow the consumers to retrieve their data in 
order to then share this data with other traders. Indeed, the proposal at the origin of the Directive outlined 
that, in order to promote competition, it is necessary to ensure that consumers can easily switch content 
providers, by reducing legal, technical and practical obstacles, such as the inability to recover all the data 
that the consumer has produced or generated through his use of digital content.121 This is because the 
consumer could be deterred from terminating a contract for digital content or a digital service if he cannot 
recover access to the content in question as a result of such termination.122 
 
4. Analytical framework for data sharing  
 
After having presented the dual relationship that competition, personal data protection and consumer law 
have with data sharing, this paper will now draw an analytical framework for data sharing by outlining how 
these regimes complement each other, on the one hand, and by outlining the tensions within and between 
these regimes, on the other hand. 
 
4.1. Complementarity between the regimes 
 
While competition, personal data protection and consumer law have their own objectives, they complement 
one another as the effects or outcomes of one regime can further the goals of another regime. This is 
apparent from the fact that competition law potentially limits data sharing, which furthers the goals of the 
personal data protection principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation. This is also apparent from 
the fact that, to some extent, the data retrieval right under the Digital Content Directive complements and 
aligns with the GDPR’s right to data portability. 
 
4.1.1. Competition law potentially limits data sharing, furthering the goals of personal data protection  
 
Competition law can stand in the way of data sharing when the exchange of data leads to collusion under 
Article 101 TFEU or gives rise to competition concerns under merger review due to the combination of the 
datasets of the merging parties. In such cases, the application of competition law at the same time will 
further compliance with data protection law. When data is kept separate in order to prevent collusion under 
                                                 
118 Article 16.4, al. 2 of the Directive 2019/770. 
119 Articles 16.3 and 16.4, al. 1 of the Directive 2019/770. 
120 Recital 71 of the Directive 2019/770. 
121 Proposal for a Directive of the European parliament and of the council on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of 
digital content, 9 December 2015, COM(2015) 634, p. 22. 
122 Recital 70 of the Directive 2019/770. 
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Article 101 TFEU or to address a significant impediment to effective competition under merger review, 
this also prevents data processing from running counter to the data protection principles of data 
minimisation and purpose limitation. Competition law is then applied to protect economic efficiency and 
at the same time achieves results that foster data protection considerations as well.  
 
This interaction of competition law with data protection law also works the other way around. By imposing 
restrictions on the extent to which personal data can be combined or exchanged, the GDPR can act as a 
limit restricting the room for anticompetitive effects to arise. Such a reasoning came up in the 
Microsoft/LinkedIn merger decision where the Commission explained that Microsoft is subject to EU data 
protection rules that limit “its ability to undertake any treatment of LinkedIn full data”.123 As such, the 
reliance on data protection law was one of the elements in the Commission’s reasoning concluding that the 
combination of the datasets of the two merging parties did not raise competition concerns. Although it is a 
welcome development that the Commission integrates data protection law into its competition assessment 
to let the regimes complement each other’s effects, a cautious approach is necessary to make sure that the 
data protection rules relied upon are indeed capable of restricting the scope for market players to engage in 
anticompetitive conduct.124 
 
4.1.2. Alignment of the data retrieval right under the Digital Content Directive with the 
GDPR’s data portability right 
 
To some extent, the data retrieval right contained in Article 16.4 of the Digital Content Directive (DCD) 
aligns with the data portability right contained in Article 20 of the GDPR. This is apparent from a 
comparison of the two provisions.125 Apart from the application of these data protection and consumer law 




The goal of the data portability right in the GDPR is to strengthen the “data subject empowerment”, i.e. the 
power of control that the data subjects have on their own personal data.127 This “data subject empowerment” 
objective is translated into two sub-objectives. 
 
On the one hand, in a strict conception of the notion of "data subject empowerment", this right to data 
portability in the GDPR "represents an opportunity to “re-balance” the relationship between data subject 
and data controllers", and this, "by affirming individuals’ personal rights and control over the personal 
data concerning them".128 This is an undeniable point in common with the DCD, as the "data subject 
empowerment" objective of the GDPR is part of the broader "consumer empowerment", which is the central 
objective of consumer protection law.129  
On the other hand, and in a broader conception of the notion of "data subject empowerment", this right to 
data portability in the GDPR should make it easier for the data subject to change service providers.130 Once 
again, this objective transpires in the DCD, as its goal is to ensure that consumers can easily switch content 
providers, by recovering all the data that the consumer has produced or generated through his use of digital 
                                                 
123 Case M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, 6 December 2016, par. 255. 
124 For a further discussion, see Graef, Clifford and Valcke (2018: 215-217). 
125 See, inter alia, Metzger, Efroni, Mischau & Metzger (2018:102-105); Graef, Husovec, and Purtova (2018); Ledger and Tombal 
(2018). 
126 For a discussion, see: Lynskey (2017:793-814) and Van der Auwermeulen (2017:57-72). 
127 Working Party 29, Guidelines on the right to data portability, WP 242 rev.01, 13 April 2017, p. 4. 
128 Ibidem. 
129 Proposal for a Directive of the European parliament and of the council on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of 
digital content, 9 December 2015, COM(2015) 634, p. 3. 
130 Working Party 29, Guidelines on the right to data portability, WP 242 rev.01, 13 April 2017, p. 4. 
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content.131 The GDPR and the DCD thus share a clear common objective, namely to prevent consumers 
from being "locked-in" the services of Internet giants, such as Facebook or Google. 
 
(ii) Scope of application 
 
While Article 20 of the GDPR applies to personal data that has been “provided”132 by the data subject, 
Article 16.4 of the Digital Content Directive applies to any content other than personal data, which was 
provided or created by the consumer when using the digital content or digital service supplied by the trader 
(emphasis added). The scope of application of the DCD is thus complementary to that of the GDPR. This 
is explicitly stated in the text of the DCD, which provides that the trader remains bound by the obligations 
of the GDPR133, which prevails over this Directive in the event of a conflict of provisions.134 It therefore 
seems that the objective of the final text of this Directive is to avoid any overlap with the regime of Article 
20 of the GDPR.135  
 
However, this distinction between personal and non-personal data might be problematic in practice. Indeed, 
given the GDPR's broad definition of this concept, namely "any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person"136, the vast majority of the data provided or created by the consumer may likely 
be considered as personal data. In any case, it should be underlined that the “inferred and derived” personal 
data, which are not considered as data “provided” by the data subject, are neither covered by the GDPR nor 
by the DCD, and thus cannot be ported. 
 
(iii) Data recipients 
 
While Article 20.1 of the GDPR provides that the data subject has the right to receive the personal data 
which he has provided to a controller and to transmit it to another controller without hindrance, Article 20.2 
of the GDPR provides that the data subject also has the right to have the personal data transmitted directly 
from one controller to another, “where technically feasible”. The DCD, on the other hand, does not allow 
this direct transmission, since it only aims to establish the consumer's right to recover the data personally.137 
In this sense, it is closer to the right of access contained in the GDPR, which allows a data subject to obtain 
a copy of his personal data.138 In the event that the consumer wishes to share data with a third party, the 
mechanism of the DCD is therefore less effective than the right to data portability of Article 20 of the 
GDPR. 
 
(iv) Data formats 
 
Article 20 of the GDPR states that the ported data have to be provided in a structured, commonly used and 
machine-readable format. As a welcome development, the format requirements contained in the final text 
                                                 
131 Proposal for a Directive of the European parliament and of the council on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of 
digital content, 9 December 2015, COM(2015) 634, p. 22. 
132 Are considered as “provided” the “data actively and knowingly provided by the data subject” and the “observed data provided 
by the data subject by virtue of the use of the service or the device [of the data controller]”, but not the “inferred data and derived 
data (…) created by the data controller on the basis of the data provided by the data subject” (Working Party 29, Guidelines on 
the right to data portability, WP 242 rev.01, 13 April 2017, p. 10). 
133 Article 16.2 of the Directive 2019/770. 
134 Article 3.8 of the Directive 2019/770. 
135 On the contrary, the proposal at the origin of the Directive targeted “all content provided by the consumer and any other data 
produced or generated through the consumer's use of the digital content” (Proposal for a Directive of the European parliament and 
of the council on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content, 9 December 2015, COM(2015) 634, Articles 
13.2.c) and 16.4.b)). This wording also covered personal data and thus overlapped, to some extent, with the GDPR.  
136 Article 4.1 of the GDPR. 
137 Article 16.4 of the Directive 2019/770. 
138 Article 15.3 of the GDPR. 
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of the DCD have been aligned with those provided for in the GDPR, as the data must be returned to the 
consumer “in a commonly used and machine-readable format”.139 This was not the case in the proposal at 
the origin of the Directive, which had less stringent data format requirements than Article 20 of the GDPR, 
as this initial text provided that the data had to be returned to the consumer in a “commonly used data 
format”.140 In this sense, the proposal was closer to the format requirement for the right of access in the 
GDPR, according to which the data had to be delivered in a “commonly used electronic form”.141 
 
(v) Consequences of the exercise of the right and the temporality of requests 
 
The exercise of the right to data portability does not automatically imply an obligation for the controller to 
erase the ported data.142 Accordingly, when Article 20.1 of the GDPR indicates that the data subject has the 
right to receive the personal data he has provided to the controller, this should be understood as meaning 
that the data subject has a right to receive a “copy” of this data. Moreover, the data subject can exercise his 
portability right several times towards the same data controller, notably in order to port the data that has 
been updated by the controller (who can continue to use the data) since the last portability request. Unlike 
Article 20 of the GDPR, the DCD provides that, when the consumer terminates the contract, the trader must 
refrain from using the non-personal data provided or created by the consumer.143 The fate of the data held 
by the original controller/trader therefore differs in the two regimes, as Article 20 of the GDPR does not 
prevent the original controller from continuing to use the ported data, while the DCD provides that the 
trader must refrain from using the data in the future unless it has been generated jointly by the consumer 
and others, and other consumers are able to continue to make use of the content.144 In reality, this difference 
can be explained by the fact that data can be ported at any time under the GDPR, while data portability is 
only made possible after the termination of the contract by the consumer in the DCD. 
 
(vi) Cost and deadline to process the requests 
 
The data controller may not request any payment from the data subject exercising his right to data portability 
under Article 20 of the GDPR, unless the data subject's request is manifestly unfounded or excessive, in 
particular because of its repetitive character. In such cases, the controller may either charge a reasonable 
fee based on the administrative costs incurred or even refuse to implement the request altogether.145 
Moreover, it must act on a data portability request without undue delay and in any event within one month 
of the receipt of the request, except in more complex cases, where the maximum response time is three 
months.146 Similar to the GDPR but leaving no room for traders to charge a fee or refuse to act, the DCD 
provides that the consumer shall be entitled to retrieve the data free of charge.147 Regarding the deadline to 
reply to the request, the DCD only provides that the data should be given to the consumer “within a 
reasonable time” after the termination of the contract.148 While the DCD does not provide any further 
information as to how these terms must be interpreted, the deadline of one month provided for in the GDPR 
could arguably be used to assess this “reasonable” character, in order to align these two regimes. 
                                                 
139 Article 16.4 of the Directive 2019/770. 
140 Proposal for a Directive of the European parliament and of the council on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of 
digital content, 9 December 2015, COM(2015) 634, Articles 13.2.c) and 16.4.b). 
141 Article 15.3 of the GDPR. 
142 Article 20.3 of the GDPR. 
143 Article 16.3 of the Directive 2019/770. The only exceptions are if the data has no use outside the context of the content or 
service; if the data only relates to the consumer's activity when using the content or service; if the data has been aggregated with 
other data by the trader and cannot be disaggregated or can only be disaggregated with disproportionate effort; or if the data has 
been generated jointly by the consumer and other persons who continue to use them (Article 16.3 of the Directive 2019/770). 
144 Article 16.3.d) of the Directive 2019/770. 
145 Article 12.5 of the GDPR. 
146 Article 12.3 of the GDPR. 
147 Article 16.4 of the Directive 2019/770. 
148 Article 16.4 of the Directive 2019/770. 






In light of the above, it appears that, to some extent, the regimes of the GDPR and the DCD are 
complementary and align. Indeed, these regimes share a clear common objective and have complementary 
scopes of application. Moreover, they are aligned in terms of costs and deadline to process the request, and 
in terms of format requirements. However, these regimes diverge when it comes to the data recipients and 
to the consequences of the exercise of the right and the temporality of requests. It is thus clear that the 
European legislator has attempted to align the two regimes as much as possible, in order to avoid complex 
situations of portability overlap, which could have led to legal uncertainties.  
 
4.2. Tensions within regimes 
 
As competition, personal data protection and consumer law have a dual relationship with data sharing, by 
both limiting and stimulating data sharing, this leads to tensions within regimes. Indeed, while competition 
law can mandate data sharing to address competition concerns, data sharing might also facilitate collusion. 
Moreover, the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation in personal data protection law limit 
data sharing, while the data portability right promotes the exchange and reuse of data. 
 
4.2.1. Competition law can mandate data sharing but data sharing can at the same time entail 
competition concerns  
 
The tension within the field of competition law relates to the fact that data sharing can be necessary as a 
remedy to address competition concerns under abuse of dominance or merger review, but at the same time 
may create concerns of collusion under Article 101 TFEU. In the context of refusals to deal, this dilemma 
is well-know. The US Supreme Court judgment in Trinko made clear that liability for refusals to deal under 
US antitrust law is very limited. In this context, Justice Scalia famously wrote that: “Enforced sharing also 
requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms 
of dealing–a role for which they are ill-suited. Moreover, compelling negotiation between competitors may 
facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion”.149 The concern is that once a competition authority or 
court obliges a dominant firm to give access to an input to address abusive behaviour, this would require 
the dominant firm to negotiate with access seekers about the price and other conditions of access. Such 
negotiations could give rise to new competition concerns, namely in the area of collusion. Another issue 
specific to data sharing as a competition law remedy is that the exchange of data by the dominant firm 
should not include commercially sensitive information. Otherwise, a competition problem under Article 
102 TFEU would be addressed by adopting a remedy that potentially directly violates Article 101 TFEU. 
The same reasoning applies to a divestiture of data as a remedy under merger review, which could similarly 
create concerns about collusion between the merged entity and third parties. 
 
The tension between the requirements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU also becomes visible in the ongoing 
Amazon investigation of the Commission. The competition concern in the case relates to the collection by 
Amazon of transaction data from downstream retailers on the basis of Amazon’s standard agreements with 
these retailers and the way Amazon can use this data to improve its own business activities as a retailer. 
This means that the case can either be constructed as a potential violation of Article 101 TFEU, when the 
agreements involve the exchange of commercially sensitive information by the retailers to Amazon, or a 
potential breach of Article 102 TFEU, when Amazon is considered to abuse its dominance, for instance, by 
using the third party transaction data to shut out retailers through offering popular products to consumers 
at a lower price. The only remedy to address possible collusion concerns would be to force Amazon to 
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discontinue the exchange of data from retailers, which would thus limit data sharing. Such a remedy can 
also address the possible abuse of dominance concerns. By requiring Amazon to refrain from using third 
party transaction data for its own downstream retail activities, a level playing field is created between 
Amazon and the independent retailers. An alternative remedy to resolve the abuse of dominance would be 
to require Amazon to share the transaction data among all independent retailers. This approach would also 
result into a level playing field, as Amazon would no longer have a competitive advantage vis-à-vis retailers 
in terms of the insights about the transactions being concluded on its marketplace. Data sharing as a remedy 
could arguably even create a more competitive market due to increased levels of transparency about the 
available offerings on Amazon’s marketplace. At the same time, one should prevent that such a remedy 
facilitates collusion among retailers. This creates a dilemma where data sharing can have both beneficial 
and detrimental effects to competition.  
 
To resolve this tension between the requirements of separate branches of competition law, data sharing as 
a remedy to address competition concerns under abuse of dominance or merger review should not go as far 
as to result into the exchange of commercially sensitive information. However, as discussed in section 2 
above in the context of data pooling, the boundaries of liability for data sharing under Article 101 TFEU 
may not be easy to draw in practice. 
 
4.2.2. Tensions between the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation and the right 
to data portability in the GDPR 
 
Tensions can also appear within the GDPR, as its principles of purpose limitation150 and data 
minimisation151 limit data sharing, while the personal data portability right152 promotes the exchange and 
reuse of data. Opinions may differ on the extent to which the relationship between these notions qualifies 
as a tension. On the one hand, the right to data portability arguably fits the fundamental rights nature of 
data protection by enhancing the control of the data subject over his or her personal data153 so that from the 
perspective of the relationship between an individual data subject and a data controller no tension occurs. 
On the other hand, ported data can also relate to other individuals and leads to the duplication of personal 
data to other controllers so that a tension occurs from the perspective of the broader impact on the data 
economy. In practice, this means that these two principles have to be considered when implementing the 
data portability right. This articulation will essentially have to be done prior to the porting of the data. 
 
Indeed, the Working Party 29 recommends that the recipient controller should inform the data subjects 
about the purposes for which the ported data will be processed and about the categories of personal data 
that are adequate, relevant and necessary for these purposes, in order to prevent a breach of these purpose 
limitation and data minimisation principles.154 Moreover, if the recipient controller realises that the data 
subject has ported more data than what is necessary for the purpose he is pursuing, he will have to delete 
this excessive data as soon as possible, in order to avoid any liability issue.155 This clarifies one of the 
uncertainties faced by the original controllers regarding the right to data portability, namely whether there 
is a risk that they might be found liable for the unlawful processing of the ported data made by the recipient 
controller, notably because of a breach of these purpose limitation and data minimisation principles. This 
uncertainty stems from the fact that the GDPR does not tackle this issue. Consistently with what has been 
outlined above about the recipient controller, the Working Party 29 has indicated that insofar as the original 
controller responds to the request for portability in compliance with the conditions of Article 20 of the 
GDPR, it should not be held liable as a result of the processing carried out on the data by the recipient 
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controller.156 Indeed, the original controller acts here on behalf of the data subject, and should not be 
responsible for any later infringement potentially committed by the recipient controller. Nevertheless, 
according to the Working Party 29, the original controller should still set up certain safeguards, such as 
internal procedures to ensure that the data that is actually transmitted matches the data whose portability is 
requested, in light of the purpose limitation and data minimisation principles.157  
 
These two principles will also have to be considered in order to limit the porting of personal data from other 
data subjects than the one exercising his data portability right. This limitation to the scope of the data sharing 
has been integrated in the provision pertaining to the data portability right, as Article 20.4 of the GDPR 
provides that this right needs to be articulated with the rights and freedoms of others, that it shall not affect. 
Accordingly, when a data subject exercises his right to data portability, it will be necessary to ensure that 
the personal data of other data subjects, who have not given their consent to such portability, are not 
transmitted, at the same time, to a recipient controller likely to process the personal data of such third 
parties.158 Indeed, while the data subject at the origin of the portability request has given his consent to the 
recipient controller or has concluded a contract with him, this is not the case for the other data subjects 
whose data could be ported as a result of the exercise of this right. In this regard, the purpose limitation 
principle must not be overlooked. Given that the third parties in question have not consented to the transfer 
of their data to the recipient controller, this transfer can only take place if the purpose for which the transfer 
is made is compatible with the original controller's initial purpose of processing.159 If this is not the case, 
the recipient controller will have to rely on a new lawful basis for the processing of these third parties’ 
personal data, such as the “legitimate interests” basis of Article 6.1.f) of the GDPR. 
 
In order to avoid such an issue, the Working Party 29 suggests that the processing of these other data 
subjects’ personal data should be authorised only insofar as these data remain under the sole control of the 
data subject requesting the portability, and that they should only be processed for the purposes determined 
by this data subject.160 The recipient controller could therefore not process these third parties’ data for 
purposes that he has defined himself, such as prospecting purposes, as this would infringe the GDPR. 
Moreover, the recipient controller could not process these data for purposes that are not compatible with 
the purposes of the original controller. While being appealing in theory, this suggestion is nevertheless 
extremely restrictive and provides little interest for the recipient controller, whose margin of manoeuvre 
will be severely limited. However, the Working Party 29 makes another suggestion that is more interesting. 
It invites both the original and the recipient controllers to implement technical tools allowing the data 
subject to select the personal data he wishes to port, while excluding, where possible, the personal data of 
other data subjects.161 This makes it possible to avoid, upstream, a potential infringement of the rights of 
these third parties. However, this is not sufficient in itself, as some personal data of third parties might 
necessarily have to be ported. Accordingly, in addition to these technical tools, it must also be reflected on 
the implementation of consent mechanisms for these other data subjects, in order to facilitate data 
portability.162 Once again, the question will arise of the difficulty of implementing such a mechanism in 
practice. For example, in the banking sector, it would be practically impossible to obtain the consent of all 
the persons appearing in a list of banking transactions that a data subject would like to port to another bank. 
 
4.3. Tensions between regimes: Compatibility with the GDPR of data sharing as a remedy to a 
competition law infringement 
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Tensions do not only appear within regimes, but also between regimes, as the approach in one regime can 
cause clashes with the objectives of another one. Indeed, as outlined above, data sharing could be required 
by a competition authority in order to remedy a competition law infringement. Yet, one must not lose track 
of the fact that some of the data at hand could be personal data. This might, at first sight, seem to create 
tensions with the policy objective of the GDPR, as one of its aims is to provide more control to the data 
subjects on the personal data concerning them. Indeed, such a data sharing remedy might lead to the 
dissemination of such personal data, consequently reducing the data subjects’ control on what happens with 
“their” data. Though some tensions might emerge between these two policy objectives, they are not 
incompatible, and sharing personal data can be beneficial for society, governments, undertakings and 
individuals.163 The challenge is thus not whether one should prevail over the other, but rather how these 
policy objectives can be reconciled.164 
 
Such data sharing remedy might come into conflict with the GDPR if the personal data is not anonymised 
prior to the transfer.165 However, this might reduce the value of the dataset and, in any case, truly effective 
anonymisation is difficult to achieve.166 In the vast majority of cases, the data will remain personal and the 
remedy will therefore have to comply with the rules of the GDPR. This requires, on the one hand, having a 
lawful basis for the data sharing, and, on the other hand, to comply with the general principles of personal 
data protection. 
 
4.3.1. Lawful bases for the data sharing 
 
According to the principle of separate justification, a remedy imposing data sharing would require a lawful 
basis at two levels, namely at level of the undertaking that holds the data and at the level of the undertaking 
that will receive the data, and these two lawful bases do not need to be the same.167 
 
(i) Lawful bases for the data holder 
 
Making the data available to a third party as a consequence of a remedy imposed by a competition authority 
amounts to a new processing for the data holder and is therefore in need of a lawful basis.168 Arguably, 
three lawful bases could potentially be used by the data holder. 
 
The first possibility would be to obtain the explicit freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous 
consent of the data subjects at hand after the competition authority’s decision.169 Indeed, obtaining a general 
consent before the decision will lack the specificity and explicitness required for the consent to be compliant 
with the GDPR.170 The data holder will therefore have to seek the data subjects’ consent to share the data 
with one or several specific recipients identified in the competition authority’s decision.171 However, it 
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might be extremely complex and burdensome to do so in practice. The French GDF Suez172 case, presented 
above, illustrates this point. The French Autorité de la concurrence found that GDF Suez had abused its 
dominant position in the market for natural gas and required GDF Suez to share certain customer 
information data with its competitors.173 It ordered GDF Suez to inform the data subjects about the sharing 
of their data with their competitors and to give them the possibility to opt-out from this transfer.174 Given 
that, at the time, the Data Protection Directive175 was still in force and that this legislation was silent about 
whether such an opt-out solution was admissible, this seemed like an appropriate way to balance the 
personal data protection and competition considerations.176 However, now that the GDPR is in force, 
requiring the data subjects to opt-out of the transfer, rather than to opt-in to the transfer, would no longer 
be GDPR-compliant, as, according to Article 4.11 of the GDPR, the data subject has to explicitly consent 
to the transfer.177 This makes it much more cumbersome for the data holder and will surely affect the 
efficiency in practice of the data sharing remedy if the data holder relies on consent as a lawful basis for 
the transfer, as it is very likely that there will be fewer data subjects that opt-in than data subjects that do 
not opt-out.178 
 
The second possibility would be to consider that the data sharing is necessary for the compliance with a 
legal obligation to which the data holder is subject.179 The question here is whether a decision by a 
competition authority could qualify as such a legal obligation.180 Indeed, Article 5.3 of the GDPR provides 
that the basis for the processing shall be laid down in Union law or Member State law. However, the word 
“law” is not defined anywhere in the GDPR. In that regard, the interpretation, by the European Court of 
Human Rights, of the requirement of the legality of an interference with a fundamental right181 should be 
reminded. The Court consistently holds that the term “law” must not be given a “formal interpretation”, 
which would necessarily imply the existence of a written statute having a legislative value, but rather a 
“material interpretation”182, which not only covers the written statutes, but all the legal rules in force.183 
Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has acknowledged that parliamentary proceedings, decisions, 
regulations or unwritten rules of law, such as case law decisions, could satisfy the requirement of legality.184 
Arguably, a similar interpretation could be given to the words “law” and “legal obligation” in the GDPR, 
and, accordingly, a competition authority’s decision imposing data sharing could qualify as a “legal 
obligation”.  
 
The third possibility could be to argue that sharing the data is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate 
interests pursued by the data holder, and that these interests are not overridden by the interests or 
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fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects.185 For the data holder, the legitimate interest could 
be that it has to comply with a competition authority’s decision in order to avoid a potential substantial fine, 
but also that the data sharing would ensure a competitive environment that will benefit the consumers.186 
The key question is therefore whether the data holder’s legitimate interest outweighs the data subjects’ 
interests. As more undertakings will get access to their personal data due to the data sharing, this potentially 
reduces the data subjects’ privacy. Moreover, it might also arguably increase the risks of de-anonymisation 
of other data, as making more data available increases the risk of re-identification through the “crossing” 
of information from various sources.187 Accordingly, there might be cases where the legitimate interests of 
the data holder should not prevail over the data subjects’ interests, and Article 6.1.f) of the GDPR should 
not be considered as a viable lawful basis for the data sharing remedy.  
 
However, there are other cases where this data sharing might allow competitors to create privacy-oriented 
alternatives to existing services, which would benefit the data subjects in the long term. Indeed, the 
development of competitive alternatives is necessary to prevent data subjects from being “locked in” the 
services of the existing providers, as more switching possibilities would allow the data subjects to 
“penalise” more easily data controllers that violate (repeatedly) their privacy. Therefore, mandating data 
sharing might also, in certain situations, be beneficial for the data subjects as it will allow more privacy-
oriented competition. In those cases, the legitimate interests of the data holder could prevail over the data 
subjects’ interests – and might actually be aligned with these interests –, and accordingly the data sharing 
could be justified on the basis of Article 6.1.f) of the GDPR. 
 
(ii) Lawful bases for the data recipient 
 
While the data holder has to have a lawful basis to share data with the recipient, the data recipient also 
needs his own specific lawful basis for the processing that will be done once he has received the data.188 
Contrary to the data holder, the recipient should not be able to argue that this further processing is necessary 
for the compliance with a legal obligation to which he is subject. This is because, while the competition 
authority’s decision to impose a data sharing remedy could arguably be considered as a legal obligation for 
the data holder that must comply with this decision, this decision does not impose any obligation on the 
data recipient to process the shared data. Therefore, the recipient cannot argue that he must necessarily 
process the data as a result of the competition authority’s decision. Rather, he will have to rely on one of 
the other two lawful bases available to him, namely consent or the necessary processing for the purposes 
of the legitimate interests that he pursues. 
 
The first basis for the data recipient could thus be the obtaining of the explicit freely given, specific, 
informed and unambiguous consent of the data subjects at hand after the competition authority’s 
decision.189 In this regard, what has been said above about consent as a lawful basis for the data holder can 
be transposed and will not be repeated. 
 
The other possibility for the data recipient would be to argue that the data processing is necessary for the 
purposes of the legitimate interests that he pursues, and that these interests are not overridden by the 
interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects.190 For the data recipient, the legitimate 
interests would be the opportunity to offer (privacy-oriented) alternative products or services to the 
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consumers, to restore competition on the market, and to reduce the data holder’s competitive advantage.191 
Once again, the key question is therefore whether the data recipient’s legitimate interests outweigh the data 
subjects’ interests. In this regard, the above developments pertaining to the data holder can be transposed 
as well. There might thus be some cases where this further processing might allow competitors to create 
privacy-oriented alternatives to existing services, which would benefit the data subjects in the long term. In 
those cases, the legitimate interests of the data recipient could prevail over the data subjects’ interests – and 
might be aligned with these interests –, and accordingly the data could be processed on the basis of Article 
6.1.f) of the GDPR. To achieve this balancing exercise, the data recipient will need to be very specific about 
the use he will make of the shared data (e.g. which products or services he intends to offer thanks to the 
data, whether they are privacy-oriented or not, etc.), as this will allow to determine if this further processing 
would be harmful, or on the contrary beneficial, to the data subjects. 
 
4.3.2. Compliance with the general principles of personal data protection 
 
In order for data sharing as a remedy to be compatible with the data protection rules, the data holder and 
the data recipient must not only rely on a lawful basis for the processing, but they must also comply with 
the general principles of personal data protection. To do so, both the data holder and the data recipient will 
have to inform the data subjects about the personal data processing deriving from this data sharing remedy, 
in a fair and transparent manner.192 On the one hand, the data holder will have to inform the data subjects 
that it has been compelled by a competition authority to make some of the personal data concerning them 
available to a third party as a remedy to a competition law infringement.193 On the other hand, the data 
recipient will have to inform the data subjects about the further processing it will conduct on the data 
covered by the remedy.194 
 
Moreover, both the data holder and the data recipient will have to comply with the purpose limitation 
principle.195 This outlines the importance of defining in advice, and ideally already in the competition 
authority’s decision, for which specific purpose the data shall be shared (e.g. which products or services 
does the data recipient intend to offer thanks to the data). Additionally, the data holder and the data recipient 
will have to comply with the data minimisation principle.196 In this regard, the data sharing remedy should 
only cover the data that is necessary to fulfil the specific purpose of the processing defined by the 
competition authority’s decision. In the same vein, the accuracy of the shared data should be ensured and 
the data recipient should store it for no longer than is necessary for this specific purpose.197 
 
Finally, the data holder and the data recipient will have to implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures in order to ensure the security of the data during the sharing and during the further 
processing198, and they will have to document how the concrete implementation of the data sharing remedy 
complies with all of the above-mentioned principles, in light of the accountability principle.199 
 
In conclusion, while some tensions might emerge between the two regimes, they are not incompatible, and 
they can be reconciled by making a competition law duty to share data compliant with data protection 
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principles. This implies the need for competition and data protection authorities to collaborate on this 
matter. 
  
5. Conclusion  
 
This paper shows that data sharing presents many opportunities, in particular in reaping the benefits of big 
data analysis, stimulating innovation or ensuring an innovation level playing field between undertakings 
which have many data and those which have less. However, data sharing also presents several risks in 
facilitating explicit or tacit collusion between firms or the exploitation of consumers as well as in 
undermining of privacy. Moreover, compulsory data sharing may decrease the incentives of data holders to 
collect, store and analyse data as well as the incentives of data seekers to collect, store or analyse themselves 
instead of relying of the work done by others. Therefore, the optimal regulatory framework relating to data 
sharing should maximise those benefits of data sharing while minimising those risks. 
 
Such regulatory framework is based on a combination of many legal instruments, some being horizontal 
(in particular competition protection, consumer protection and data protection laws) and others being 
sectoral (for instance in the financial, automotive, energy or agricultural sectors). It should be recognised 
that, if they are implemented effectively, the horizontal instruments could already facilitate or even impose 
the sharing of data in many circumstances. Those existing horizontal rules should be complemented with 
new sectoral rules only when they have proved to be insufficient given the particular characteristics of the 
sector.  
 
In addition, it is of the utmost importance that those horizontal and sectoral legal instruments are applied 
consistently. This means, on the one hand, that any conflict should be alleviated or minimised and, on the 
other hand, that instruments should be applied more as complements than as substitutes. As those legal 
instruments, in particular the horizontal ones, are based on open norms which leave an important margin of 
interpretation by the regulatory authorities and the judges, it is recommended that those institutions interpret 
the law in a manner that minimises conflict and maximises complementarity.  
 
Such an objective can only be achieved if the authorities in charge of the enforcement of the different legal 
instruments cooperate closely with each other to ensure consistent and complementary interpretation of the 
instruments they are in charge with. In case of conflict, dialogue between the authorities could minimise 
them and arbitrate them in a transparent manner. 
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